When a Child Kills With an E-Motorcycle: An Attorney’s Look at the Civil Liability Facing the Aliso Viejo Mother Charged in Lake Forest E-Bike Death

By Steven M. Sweat | California personal injury and wrongful death attorney

The criminal case dominating California news this week — Orange County prosecutors charging Aliso Viejo mother Tommi Jo Mejer with felony involuntary manslaughter, child endangerment, and accessory after the fact after her 14-year-old son allegedly struck and killed 81-year-old Vietnam veteran Ed Ashman with a Surron Ultra Bee e-motorcycle in Lake Forest — is being framed almost entirely as a criminal accountability story. District Attorney Todd Spitzer’s promise to prosecute parents who hand their children “loaded weapons” on two wheels has rightly captured public attention.

But there is a second, quieter legal track running parallel to that prosecution — one that matters enormously to the Ashman family and to every California family who will inevitably be hurt by an unlicensed teenager on an over-powered electric two-wheeler. That track is the civil case for wrongful death, and the parental civil liability rules in California are far broader than most people realize.

I have practiced personal injury and wrongful death law in California for more than 30 years. In this article I want to set aside the criminal charges and examine, as I would in evaluating a wrongful death claim, exactly how California civil law allows an injured pedestrian — or in this case, the family of a deceased pedestrian — to hold a parent personally accountable for the conduct of a minor child who killed someone with a motor vehicle.

The Facts That Drive the Civil Analysis

According to the Orange County District Attorney’s Office and multiple news reports, the relevant facts include:

On April 16, 2026, the 14-year-old son of Tommi Jo Mejer was riding a Surron Ultra Bee e-motorcycle in Lake Forest near Toledo Way and Ridge Route Drive.
The bike is capable of speeds up to approximately 58 mph and is classified under California law as a motorcycle, requiring a license, registration, and insurance to operate on public roads. It is not a Class 1, 2, or 3 e-bike under California Vehicle Code § 312.5.
The teenager was reportedly doing wheelies in the roadway when he struck Mr. Ashman, who was walking home from his substitute teaching job at El Toro High School. The rider then fled the scene.
Mr. Ashman, age 81, suffered catastrophic injuries and died approximately two weeks later.
Prosecutors allege that nearly a year before the fatal crash, in June 2025, Orange County Sheriff’s deputies spent roughly 30 minutes warning Ms. Mejer that her son could not legally ride the bike and that she could face criminal charges if she continued to allow it. Investigators say she admitted purchasing the bike for her son and acknowledged that he rode it recklessly.
After the fatal crash, prosecutors allege Ms. Mejer gave deputies false information, claiming neither she nor her son had access to such a vehicle.

From a civil liability standpoint, that fact pattern is essentially a textbook negligent entrustment case layered on top of multiple statutory parental liability theories. Let me walk through each one.

Theory One: Civil Code § 1714.1 — Imputed Liability for a Minor’s “Willful Misconduct”

California Civil Code § 1714.1(a) provides:

“Any act of willful misconduct of a minor that results in injury or death to another person or in any injury to the property of another shall be imputed to the parent or guardian having custody and control of the minor for all purposes of civil damages, and the parent or guardian having custody and control shall be jointly and severally liable with the minor for any damages resulting from the willful misconduct.”

This statute is one of the foundational vehicles for parental civil liability in California. It does not require the parent to have done anything wrong personally. The minor’s willful conduct is imputed — legally transferred — to the custodial parent.

The key word is “willful.” California courts have held that “willful misconduct” under § 1714.1 does not require the minor to have intended the specific harm; it requires the minor to have intended the act that produced the harm. (See Ellis v. D’Angelo (1953) 116 Cal.App.2d 310; Robertson v. Wentz (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1281.) A 14-year-old who deliberately rides a 58-mph motorcycle on a public street, deliberately performs wheelies, and deliberately flees the scene of a collision is engaging in conduct that goes well beyond ordinary negligence. The willfulness element is, in my professional opinion, eminently provable on these alleged facts.

The major limitation of § 1714.1 is its damages cap. The statute caps imputed liability at $25,000 per tort, adjusted every two years by the Judicial Council for cost-of-living increases. As of 2026, that cap stands at approximately $56,400. The statute also limits recovery in personal injury cases to medical, dental, and hospital expenses — not pain and suffering, not lost wages, not loss of life’s enjoyment.

For a wrongful death claim arising out of catastrophic injuries to an 81-year-old man who lingered for two weeks, that cap is plainly inadequate. But § 1714.1 is only the first arrow in the quiver. Critically, the statute itself states: “The liability imposed by this section is in addition to any liability now imposed by law.” The cap on § 1714.1 does not cap any of the other theories of parental liability that apply.

Theory Two: Vehicle Code § 17708 — Parental Liability for Permitting a Minor to Drive

California Vehicle Code § 17708 imposes joint and several liability on any parent who gives “express or implied permission” to a minor to operate a motor vehicle on a highway:

“Any civil liability of a minor, whether licensed or not under this code, arising out of his driving a motor vehicle upon a highway with the express or implied permission of the parents or the person or guardian having custody of the minor is hereby imposed upon the parents, person, or guardian and the parents, person, or guardian shall be jointly and severally liable with the minor for any damages proximately resulting from the negligent or wrongful act or omission of the minor in driving a motor vehicle.”

The statute applies whether or not the minor is licensed — which matters here, because a 14-year-old cannot legally hold a motorcycle endorsement in California. It also applies on a theory of mere negligence. There is no requirement to prove willful misconduct.

The closely related Vehicle Code § 17707 imposes the same liability on whoever signed the minor’s driver’s license application, but that section is inapplicable here because the rider was 14 and unlicensed. Section 17708 does the work in this case, and based on the alleged facts — the mother bought the bike, knew her son rode it, and was warned a year earlier by sheriff’s deputies — the question of whether she gave at least implied permission to operate it on the day of the crash is, on these facts, a strong one for a plaintiff.

The statutory caps under §§ 17707 and 17708 are set by Vehicle Code § 17709 at $15,000 for injury or death of one person, $30,000 for all persons injured in one accident, and $5,000 for property damage. These are low caps. But, as with § 1714.1, they apply only to vicarious liability — liability imposed on the parent solely because of what the minor did. They do not cap the parent’s liability for her own independent negligence.

Theory Three: Negligent Entrustment — The Uncapped Theory

This is, in my view, the most important civil theory in this case and the one that exposes the mother to full, uncapped wrongful death damages.

Negligent entrustment is an independent tort recognized for decades in California. (See Allen v. Toledo (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 415, 419–420.) Unlike vicarious liability under § 17708 — which focuses on the minor’s conduct and imputes it to the parent — negligent entrustment focuses on the parent’s own conduct in providing the vehicle. The parent is sued not as a substitute for the child, but as a direct tortfeasor.

The elements of negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle are spelled out in California Civil Jury Instructions (CACI) No. 724:

The driver was negligent in operating the vehicle;
The defendant owned or had possession of the vehicle with the owner’s permission;
The defendant knew, or should have known, that the driver was incompetent or unfit to drive the vehicle;
The defendant permitted the driver to drive the vehicle; and
The driver’s incompetence, inexperience, or unfitness was a substantial factor in causing harm to the plaintiff.

Applying that framework to the alleged facts of this case:

Ownership/possession — Prosecutors say the mother purchased the Surron for her son.
Knowledge of unfitness — The mother allegedly admitted to deputies in June 2025 that her son rode recklessly. Deputies allegedly explained for nearly 30 minutes that her son could not legally operate the bike. Her own son’s age — 14, with no license, no motorcycle training, and no legal right to operate a 58-mph motorcycle on a public road — is itself powerful evidence of unfitness.
Permission — She allegedly continued to allow him to ride the bike after the warning.
Substantial factor in causing harm — The unlicensed, untrained, allegedly reckless rider doing wheelies struck and killed a pedestrian.

The fundamental difference between negligent entrustment and the statutory vicarious liability theories is that negligent entrustment is not capped. Because it is the parent’s own negligence at issue, the parent is liable for the full measure of damages proximately caused — including the wrongful death damages recoverable under California Code of Civil Procedure § 377.60 et seq. Those damages can include the reasonable value of financial support the decedent would have contributed, funeral and burial expenses, and the loss of love, companionship, comfort, care, assistance, protection, affection, society, and moral support. There is no statutory ceiling.

California courts have repeatedly applied negligent entrustment in parent-child cases involving vehicles. The principle has even been extended to a co-owner father who failed to remove his name from a truck title or take other steps to stop his medically unfit son from driving. (Ghezavat v. Harris, Cal. Ct. App. Case No. A154405.) The parallel to a mother who buys a 58-mph motorcycle for her 14-year-old son, is warned by law enforcement, and continues to permit access is direct.

Theory Four: Negligent Supervision and General Negligence Under Civil Code § 1714(a)

California’s foundational tort statute, Civil Code § 1714(a), provides that “Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person.” That broad duty extends to parents who, knowing of a child’s dangerous tendencies, fail to take reasonable steps to prevent foreseeable harm to others. (See Robertson v. Wentz (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1281; Reida v. Lund (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 698.)

The negligent supervision theory becomes especially powerful where, as alleged here, the parent has actual notice — from law enforcement, no less — that the child is engaged in conduct that creates a foreseeable risk of serious injury to others, and the parent declines to take reasonable corrective steps. Negligent supervision is also uncapped.

Theory Five: Agency / Family Purpose

California also recognizes that when a minor is operating a vehicle as the parent’s agent, the parent’s vicarious liability is not limited by the Vehicle Code §§ 17707/17708 caps. (Johnson v. Peterson (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 619.) Whether agency could be established here would depend on facts not yet public — for example, whether the son was running an errand or otherwise acting at the mother’s direction at the time. In most teenage joyriding cases agency is not the strongest theory, but it should be evaluated.

Putting It Together: What Civil Recovery Looks Like in a Case Like This

If a wrongful death action were filed on behalf of Mr. Ashman’s family (and the two-year statute of limitations under California Code of Civil Procedure § 335.1 makes that decision time-sensitive), the practical liability picture against the mother would look something like this:

Capped vicarious liability under Civil Code § 1714.1 (~$56,400 for medical/hospital expenses, given willful misconduct) and Vehicle Code § 17708 ($15,000 for one person killed). These are floors, not ceilings.
Uncapped direct liability under negligent entrustment (CACI 724) and negligent supervision (Civil Code § 1714(a)). Damages here are the full wrongful death measure — likely the lion’s share of any recovery.

There is a critical insurance wrinkle that often gets overlooked. Most homeowner’s and renter’s policies exclude coverage for injuries arising from the use of a “motor vehicle” — and a Surron Ultra Bee, classified as a motorcycle under California law, will almost certainly fall within that exclusion. Standard auto policies, in turn, typically only cover vehicles listed on the policy. If the e-motorcycle was unregistered, uninsured, and unlicensed — which is exactly what prosecutors allege — there may be no liability insurance available at all to satisfy the family’s wrongful death damages. That is the kind of coverage problem that turns a clear-liability case into a complicated collections case.

For the family of any pedestrian killed under these circumstances, the practical answer to that gap is uninsured motorist (UM) coverage on the decedent’s own auto policy. UM coverage in California is generally available to the named insured and family members for injuries caused by hit-and-run drivers (Mr. Ashman’s case allegedly involves a fleeing rider) and by drivers operating without insurance. UM is one of the most under-utilized coverages in pedestrian fatality cases, and securing it requires prompt notice to the insurer and careful navigation of the claim process.

What This Case Means for Other California Families

The Lake Forest tragedy is not isolated. Orange County alone has filed child endangerment charges against three parents since January 2026 in cases involving children illegally riding e-motorcycles. The Surron, the Talaria, the modified pedal-class e-bike that has been chipped to disable its 20-mph speed limiter — these are increasingly common vehicles in Southern California neighborhoods, and they are killing people.

Two messages bear emphasizing.

To parents: Buying a teenager an e-motorcycle, or modifying an e-bike to exceed Class 3 speeds, is not a parenting choice insulated from civil liability. If your child injures or kills another road user with such a vehicle, you can — and likely will — be sued personally for the full measure of damages. The damages caps in Civil Code § 1714.1 and Vehicle Code §§ 17707/17708 are not a shield; they are a floor on top of which uncapped negligent entrustment and negligent supervision claims will be built. And those claims may not be covered by your insurance.

To pedestrians, cyclists, and the families of victims: California law gives you robust civil remedies even when the at-fault rider is a minor with no insurance and no assets. The path to full compensation usually runs through the parent — under negligent entrustment and negligent supervision theories — and through your own UM coverage. But these claims have hard deadlines and require early evidence preservation, including the bike’s electronic data, surveillance footage, and the law enforcement records of any prior parental warnings.

Resources for E-Bike and E-Motorcycle Accident Victims

If you or a family member has been injured by an unlicensed e-bike or e-motorcycle rider in California — or if you are a rider injured because of someone else’s negligence — these resources may help:

On this blog (californiaaccidentattorneysblog.com):

On our firm’s website (victimslawyer.com):

A Final Word

The criminal prosecution of Tommi Jo Mejer is, in many ways, a watershed moment in California’s response to the e-motorcycle epidemic. But the civil consequences may end up being even more sweeping. Prosecutors talk about deterrence; civil law delivers it through the wallet. When parents understand that buying a 58-mph motor vehicle for an unlicensed 14-year-old exposes them to uncapped wrongful death liability — independent of, and on top of, any criminal charge — the cost-benefit calculus changes.

For Ed Ashman’s family, no civil judgment will replace what was lost. A 81-year-old Vietnam veteran who came home from combat to spend his retirement teaching Orange County high school students deserved to walk home from El Toro High School in safety. The civil law cannot give him back. But it can — and should — make the people responsible pay the full cost of what they took.

Steven M. Sweat is the founding attorney of Steven M. Sweat, Personal Injury Lawyers, APC, a West Los Angeles-based firm that has represented seriously injured clients and the families of those killed by negligence throughout California for over 30 years. He has been recognized by Super Lawyers since 2012 and is a member of the National Trial Lawyers Top 100 and the Multi-Million Dollar Advocates Forum. Free consultations: 866-966-5240 or victimslawyer.com. Nothing in this article is intended as legal advice for a specific case; readers facing a personal injury or wrongful death situation should consult a qualified California attorney directly.